

Ensuring Safety in Occupied Buildings

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- Elio Stocco
- Director & Principal Risk Consultant
- CEng, RPEQ, Feng (TÜV Rheinland)
- Over 30 years' experience
 - Operations / process safety / risk management consulting
- Technical Expertise:
 - Hazard identification and risk assessment (HAZOP, SIL, LOPA, CHAZOP)
 - Safety case development and auditing
 - Emergency response planning
 - Fire, toxic and explosion modelling
 - Occupied buildings risk assessment

Technical Studies 	Process Safety Management 
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hazard Identification (HAZOP, HAZID) • Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) • Safety Integrity Level (SIL) • Fire Safety Studies • Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) • Consequence Analysis • Emergency Response Planning • Hazardous Area Assessment • Occupied Building Risk Assessment (OBRA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dangerous Goods Management • Major Hazard Facilities Safety Management • Process Safety Management Studies • Safety Case Development • Safety Case Compliance Auditing • Safety Case / Report Approved Assessor • Safety Management System Development • Accident Investigation
Business Risk Management 	Training 
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business and Operational Risk Management • Enterprise-Wide Risk Management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Process Safety and Risk Management Training • Risk Mentoring

- Previous incidents
 - Fires, explosion and toxic events
- Describe the guidance to manage the risk to personnel inside buildings
- Siting evaluation based on explosion

- A vertical crack in reactor No.5 was leaking cyclohexane.
- Reactor was removed with a bypass assembly installed
- Bypass ruptured releasing a large quantity of cyclohexane
- Formed flammable vapour mixture found a ignition source
- 28 workers killed with 36 suffered injuries
- 18 fatalities in the collapsed control room

- Clean operation was organised to remove residue from vessel used to distil organic liquid in a batch process
- Residue (MNT, organic nitro products) was heated to assist removal
- Exothermic reaction within residue leading to the jet flame erupting from manway, approx. 50 m
- Flame cut through an office / control building nearby
- Flame reached four-storey office block, shattering windows and setting rooms on fire
- 5 workers killed and numerous injured

- Restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerisation unit
- Overpressure of flooded distillation tower causing a release from the vent stack
- Large flammable vapour cloud (~19,000 m² area)
- Suspected ignition source an idling diesel pickup truck
- 15 workers killed with 180 injured
- Majority of fatalities where personnel in trailers near vent stack



CSB (2007), "Investigation Report of Refinery Explosion and Fire, BP Texas City, Texas"

- Richmond, California USA (July 26, 1993)
 - Oleum release from tank car
 - Employees in the direct path sheltered indoors
 - No injuries reported to employees but 22 hospitalised in the community
- Nitro, West Virginia USA (December 5, 1995)
 - Release of a phosphorus chloride compound
 - Rain results in formation of HCl cloud that drifted off-site
 - 800 employees sheltered-in-place, no injuries reported
- Ludington, Michigan USA (February 7, 1993)
 - Release of bromine gas
 - Sheltered-in-place for 3 hours
 - No injuries

- Guidance developed for building occupants
 - API RP 752: Location of Process Plant Buildings (2009)
 - API RP 753: Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings (2007, Reaffirmed Aug 2020)
- Planning strategies address different hazards:
 - Building collapse when subject to blast loads from explosion
 - Thermal hazards from fires
 - Ingress of toxic vapour
- Assessment approach
 - Consequence based
 - Risk based
 - Spacing tables



- New and existing rigid structures permanently placed
- Management process for siting evaluations:
 - Locate personnel away from process areas
 - Minimise the use of buildings close to process areas
 - Manage occupancy within those buildings close to process areas
 - Buildings intended for occupancy should be designed, constructed, modified and maintained to protect against hazards
 - Manage the building occupancy as part of facility operation

- Determine buildings to be included in assessment scope
 - Permanent / temporary / new
- Identify process hazards with potential to impact buildings
 - For each hazard, model related scenario(s) to determine impact
- Chose the building evaluation criteria
 - Consequence-based
 - Risk-based
 - Spacing tables

- Evaluate building response to determined level of impact
- Compare impact with building siting evaluation criteria
- For an existing building, mitigation options need to be considered when the criteria is not met
- Develop and implement the mitigation plan
- Personnel performing building site evaluation must have competence in analysis techniques


- Operator should identify the situations requiring MOC:
 - A new building intended for occupancy
 - Modification to existing building that may alter vulnerability to different events
 - Moving from not intended for occupancy to occupied
 - Change in number of personnel or time spent
 - Change in the process operation
 - Hazardous material inventory
 - New equipment


- For new buildings
 - Similar overall approach
 - The building is then designed to meet the building siting evaluation criteria

- Portable buildings
 - Offices, Training Rooms, Conference Rooms, Change houses
- Guiding principles similar to API RP-752
 - Modified for portable buildings
- Restrictions on personnel
 - Only essential personnel are allowed close to process units
 - Placement requires detailed analysis
- Guidance for explosion hazards
 - Zones

- Consequence –Based Approach
- Risk–Based Approach
- In scenario development both consider:
 - Site specific data: material, inventories, operating conditions, process layout
 - Industry knowledge on history of incidents at similar sites


- Identify VCE scenarios within plant
- Assess potential for VCEs to impact existing buildings
- Determine blast loads experienced by building
- Results compared with siting evaluation criteria






US DDESB (2009), "Approve methods and algorithms for DOD Risk-Based Explosive siting"

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- Hierarchy of Mitigation Measures
 - Passive
 - Active
 - Procedural
- Typical option used
 - Reduce consequence of release
 - However this maybe difficult to do as process is normally fixed
 - Strengthening of building
 - Requires detailed structural analysis
 - Relocation of personnel to alternate locations
 - Non-essential v. Essential
 - Abandon the building

- Use industry developed guidance for locating buildings in process areas
 - Existing buildings should be checked
 - Ensure siting evaluation is undertaken for portable buildings
- Manage building occupancy as part of facility's operation through the MOC process
- Use experts to apply building siting evaluation



Webinars

- Linking Risk Assessments to Process Safety Management (May 26 2021)
- After the Bowties – The Story Continues (29 June 2021)
- Fire Safety Studies (29 July 2021)



Online Live Training

- Introduction to LOPA (19 – 20 May 2021)
- Risk Assessment Leader (25 – 28 May 2021)
- Introduction to Process Safety (22 – 23 June 2021)

For more information and registration, visit www.r4risk.com.au or contact solutions@r4risk.com.au

